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physical is taken to provide strong evidence that it is not. Fair enough, but
they need to explain why the same scruples will not force us to conclude that
temporal precedence is not constituted from the fork asymmetry and the like.
As we have seen, temporal precedence is not just a relation in the world but
a fact of our mental lives. If we are to take the phenomenology of these lives
sufficiently seriously to reject physicalism and contemplate epiphenomenalism,
then there had better be a good explanation of why we should not take our
experience of the temporal precedence of our experiences sufficiently seriously
to reject theories of temporal precedence based upon de facto irreversible
processes such as the fork asymmetry.
Acknowledgement
I wrote the material for this chapter while on research leave supported by
the AHRB Matching Research Leave scheme, for which I would like to give
thanks.
Notes
1 When Mellor was committed to the laws of nature being metaphysically
necessary (back in the days of  In Defence of Dispositions ) he might have had an
answer to this concern (Mellor 1974). Now he is prepared to allow that the same
properties may be instantiated even though the laws of physics are different
(Mellor 1995: 172). As far as I can see, he has no reason to rule out the possibility
that temporal priority may exist in a non-Einsteinian world.
2 I put forward this interpretation with some hesitation as I am not sure I
understand Mellor here. His argument appears capable of establishing that
there cannot be many facts located at a spacetime point. But this would be in
conflict with the background of his theory of temporal precedence, although not
the letter. Since the argument also occurs in the paperback edition of The Facts of
Causation, where he refers to Real Time II, I assume that Mellor still endorses it.
Epiphenomenalism and causal asymmetry 119
3 Again, I am hesitant about this. Mellor published the paperback edition of The
Facts of Causation in 1999, after Real Time II. Although he made some alterations,
this is not one of them.
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8 Is causation a genuine
relation?
Peter Menzies
1 Introduction
Over a period of more than 30 years Hugh Mellor s writings have illuminated
an enormous range of metaphysical issues to do with chance (Mellor 1971),
dispositions, laws, properties (Mellor 1991) and time (Mellor 1981). His work
has had a salutary influence in encouraging metaphysicians to think about
these issues in clear-headed, realist ways.
His work on the metaphysics of causation (Mellor 1995), in particular, is
distinguished by its rigour, cogency and originality. The main outlines of his
theory of causation are well known. He has argued that causation relates facts
primarily, with causation between events deriving from causation between
facts; that causation comes in deterministic and probabilistic varieties; that
each variety can be explained in terms of closest-world counterfactuals in
which single-case chances play a crucial role; that the important connotations
of causation are that causes precede, are contiguous with, are evidence for,
explain and are means for bringing about effects; and that these connota-
tions are consistent with, or imply, that causes increase the chances of their
effects.
There is much in Mellor s theory of causation that I find congenial. Indeed,
I hold many of the same views precisely because he has persuaded me of their
truth. But we disagree on one issue that is central to the conceptual analysis and
metaphysics of causation. The issue concerns whether causation is a genuine
relation. Mellor believes that it is not, whereas I believe that it is. In this
chapter I scrutinize his criticisms of the view that causation is a relation and,
in passing, consider some related arguments for the same sceptical conclusion
advanced by other philosophers. My conclusion that Mellor s scepticism on
this matter is misplaced is not too surprising, but some of the arguments I
rely on to reach this conclusion highlight a surprising and hitherto overlooked
feature of the concept of causation.
2 Causation as an intrinsic relation
Before detailing Mellor s criticisms of the conception of causation as a real
relation, it is worthwhile considering what reasons there might be that favour
Is causation a genuine relation? 121
this conception. One reason I have given is that our intuitive judgements about [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]