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government is twofold. From the point of view of the govern-
ment, the problem is to secure acquiescence from the governed;
from the point of view of the governed, the problem is to make
the government take account, not only of its own interests, but
also of the interests of those over whom it has power. If either of
these problems is completely solved, the other does not arise; if
neither is solved, there is revolution. But as a rule a compromise
solution is reached. Apart from brute force, the principal factors
on the government side are tradition, religion, fear of foreign
enemies, and the natural desire of most men to follow a leader.
For the protection of the governed, only one method has been
hitherto discovered which is in any degree effective, namely,
democracy.
Democracy, as a method of government, is subject to some
limitations which are essential, and to others which are, in prin-
ciple, avoidable. The essential limitations arise chiefly from two
sources: some decisions must be speedy, and others require
expert knowledge. When Great Britain abandoned the gold
standard in 1931, both factors were involved: it was absolutely
necessary to act quickly, and the questions involved were such as
most men could not understand. The democracy, therefore,
could only express its opinion retrospectively. War, though less
technical than currency, has even more urgency: it is possible to
consult Parliament or Congress (though as a rule this is some-
thing of a farce, since the issue will have been already decided in
fact, if not in form), but it is impossible to consult the electorate.
Owing to these essential limitations, many of the most
important matters must be entrusted by the electorate to the
156 powers and forms of governments
Government. Democracy is successful in so far as the Govern-
ment is obliged to respect public opinion. The Long Parliament
decreed that it could not be dissolved without its own consent;
what has hindered subsequent Parliaments from doing likewise?
The answer is neither simple nor reassuring. In the first place, in
the absence of a revolutionary situation, members of the out-
going Parliament were assured of a pleasant life even if they
belonged to the defeated party; most of them would be re-
elected, and, if they lost the pleasures of government, they
would gain the almost equal satisfactions to be obtained by pub-
licly criticising the mistakes of their rivals. And in due course
they would return to power. If, on the other hand, they made it
impossible for the electorate to get rid of them by constitutional
means, they would create a revolutionary situation, which
would endanger their property and perhaps their lives. The fate
of Strafford and Charles I was a warning against rashness.
All this would be different if a revolutionary situation were
already in existence. Suppose a Conservative Parliament had rea-
son to fear that the next election would produce a Communist
majority, which would expropriate private property without
compensation. In such a case, the party in power might well
imitate the Long Parliament, and decree its own perpetuity. It
would hardly be restrained from this action by reverence for the
principles of democracy; it would be restrained, if at all, only by
a doubt as to the loyalty of the armed forces.
The moral is that a democracy, since it is compelled to entrust
power to elected representatives, cannot feel any security that, in a
revolutionary situation, its representatives will continue to repre-
sent its wishes. The wishes of Parliament may, in easily conceiv-
able circumstances, be opposed to those of a majority of the
nation. If Parliament, in such circumstances, can rely upon a pre-
ponderance of force, it may thwart the majority with impunity.
This is not to say that there is a better form of government
than democracy. It is only to say that there are issues as to which
powers and forms of governments 157
men will fight, and when they arise no form of government can
prevent civil war. One of the most important purposes of gov-
ernment should be to prevent issues from becoming so acute as
to lead to civil war; and from this point of view democracy,
where it is habitual, is probably preferable to any other known
form of government.
The difficulty of democracy, as a form of government, is that
it demands a readiness for compromise. The beaten party must
not consider that a principle is involved of such importance as to
make it pusillanimous to yield; on the other hand, the majority
must not press the advantage to the point at which it provokes a
revolt. This requires practice, respect for the law, and the habit of
believing that opinions other than one s own may not be a proof
of wickedness. What is even more necessary, there must not be a
state of acute fear, for, when there is such a state, men look for a
leader and submit to him when found, with the result that he
probably becomes a dictator. Given these conditions, democracy
is capable of being the most stable form of government hitherto
devised. In the United States, Great Britain, the Dominions, [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]